Reasoning by Analogy and by Difference

Abstract The article presents a novel and extended analysis of reasoning by analogy. It delves deeper into the concept of ‘domain’, derived from Wittgenstein’s idea of categories, which serves as a fundamental aspect in defining relative analogies. Building upon this foundation, it closely examines what the literature refers to as ‘determination rules’, and specifies their probabilistic and non-monotonic forms. A detailed exploration of the range of specific cases that can be encountered, introducing new concepts such as separation rules, counter-determination rules, and counter-separation rules, is proposed. Subsequently, we illustrate how this set of rules enables a unified set of inference schemes of analogical reasoning. This leads to address examples typically treated as independent and specific instances in the literature, often relying on vague epistemic recommendations. The article suggests that reasoning by analogy is a particular case within a broader framework of reasoning by analogy and by difference, shedding light on various analogical debates.